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WHAT ARE CRIMINAL FALSE PRETENCES?
Izi England and in nearly all, if not all, of the American states,
there are statutes against what is called obtaining goods by means
of false pretences. By some of these statutes this offence is made
a misdemeanor, by others a felony. The statute 24 and 25 Vict.,
ch. 90, sect. 88, provides that: "Whosoever shall, by any false
pretence, obtain from any other person any chattel, money or valuable
security, with intent to defraud, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
The.statutes upon this subject are generally of a similar character;
and are the outgrowth of the common-law doctrine upon the subject
of cheats. They have been enacted to meet the wants of "the
extended trade and more refined culture of modem times," which
"c require a certain degree of universal confidence to be placed in
the mere verbal representations of men." It may be safely affirmed
as a question of morality, that any attempt by one party to influence
another by artifice or trick, and to induce him to part with his goods
without receiving a true equivalent therefor is vicious. But it must
not be understood that every immoral attempt to obtaifi an advantage
in trade is criminal. "These statutes," says a learned author,
"are construed in reference to the spirit and reasons of the common
law; and they do not, therefore, extend, as the non-professional
reader might suppose, to every imaginable kind of false pretence :"
Bishop's Cr. Law, vol. 1, § 1019. What, then, are false pretences
within the statute? In 1?cgina v. Lince, 12 Cox's Cr. Cas. 451,
VOL. XXV.-41 (321)
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the pretence charged was that the prisoner lived at a certain beer-
house and was the landlord thereof, and this was held to be within
the statute; the evidence showed that the prisoner did not say he
was the landlord, but only that he lived at the house; and the
prosecutor testified that he was influenced by the belief that the
prisoner was the nephew of his servant as well as by his assertion
that he was the occupier of the beer-house; the prisoner was found
guilty and the case was reserved for the opinion of the court of
criminal appeal. Upon the appeal it was held that the pretence
proven was sufficient to sustain the conviction, and that it was imma-
terial "that the prosecutor was influenced by other circumstances
than the false pretence."
In Regina v. English, Ch. J. COCKBURN held that it was criminal
to falsely pretend, with intent to defraud, that a certain field was a
good and profitable brick-field; and that it was sufficient to show
that the prosecutor was partly influenced to do what he did by the
pretence: 12 Cox's Cr. Cas. 171.
In Regina v. Jennison, 1 Leigh & Cave "157, the prisoner had
falsely represented to a woman that he was unmarried, and promised
to marry her, by means of which he obtained money from her. It
was held that the false promise was not the subject of an indictment,
but that the false pretence was. See Rex v. Young, 3 Term It.
98 ; Rex v. Airy, 2 East 30 ; Regina v. Capeland, Ca. & Marsh.
516.
The secretary of an Odd Fellows' lodge falsely represented to a
member that he owed the lodge a sum of money, and so obtained
the money; and it was held that he was rightly convicted of
obtaining money by false pretences: Reg. v. Wooley, 1 Den. C. C.
559.
To falsely pretend that one lives with and is employed by another,
is within the statute: People v. Johnson, 12 Johns. 292. In People
v. -Dalton, 2 Wheeler's Cr. Cas. 161, the defendant had falsely pre-
tended that he was a grocer and resided at a particular place, and
it was held to be criminal.
A false statement by a buyer of goods that he was solvent and
never had a note protested, was held a criminal false pretence: Peo-
ple v. Haynes, 11 Wend. 557. This case was afterwards reversed,
but not upon this question; s. c. 14 Wend. 547. See Common-
wealth v. -Davidson, 1 Cush. 33.
In Thomas v. The People, 34 N. Y. 351, the pretence charged
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was that the defendant was a chaplain in the army, and it was held
sufficient.
It is a pretence within the statute to falsely represent that a bank
check is good and of the value stated on its face: Mfaley v. The
State, 31 Ind. 192.
Pretences as to a person's pecuniary condition, or his business,
situation, residence, or standing in life, have all been held criminal,
if made filsely with intent to defraud; and the cases cited furnish
illustrations. The general principle to be deduced from these cases
is: that whenever a person falsely represents, as an existing fact,
that which is not an existing fact, with knowledge of the falsity of
the representation, and with intent to defraud, and so obtains any-
thing of value, the offence is complete.
Some of the American cases lay down the doctrine that the pre-
tences, to be criminal, must be of a character calculated to deceive
a man of ordinary caution: State v. &'mpson, 8 Hawks 620 ; Peo-
ple v. Haynes, 11 Wend. 557; State v. Atagee, 11 Ind. 154.
The construction of the statute given by these cases is certainly.
open to criticism. It is not warranted by the language of the statute,
which speaks of "any false pretences," and it requires the selection
of an ideal intelligence, and tests all cases by the inquiry, whether
the pretences are such as are likely to mislead the person possessing
this intelligence.
If by means of any false pretences. one person obtains the pro-
perty of another with intent to defraud, it ought to be said, as was
said in Greenough's Case, 31 Verm. 279, "it is no good reason for
the offender to allege that, by the use of due diligence or ordinary
care, the imposition might have been prevented."
If the principle, that want of caution on the part of the victim
is a sufficient shield for the swindler, is sound; there is, no reason
why it should not be extended to other offences. In an unguarded
moment a rascal obtains another's money by a trick;_ the owner of
a horse leaves his stable door unlocked, and a thi f steals the horse;
when the first is prosecuted he says: "This man was a fool ; if he
had exercised ordinary caution, I could not have imposed upon him ;"
and the law acquits him; when the horse-thief is put upon trial, he
says: "If the owner of this horse had used ordinary c-,ution and
locked his stable door I could not have stolen his horse; " and must
not the law acquit him also? To be consistent it must. The illus-
tration demon trates the absurdity of the doctrine. It is nothing
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more than the introduction into the criminal law of the principle
that negligence on the part of the victim constitutes a defence for
the criminal. The true principle is: "If the prosecutor believed
the pretence, and parted with his property relying on it, there is
no need he should have acted in the transactionwith ordinary care
and caution :" Bish. Cr. Law, vol. 2, § 440.
It is practicably impossible "to estimate the -weight of a false
pretence only by its effect. It is not an absolute thing, to be handled
qnd weighed, -p so much material substance; it is a breath issuing
forth from the mouth of man, and no man can know what it will
accomplish only as he looks at its effect. * * * And no man of
business was ever found so wary as not to commit at some time in
his life a mistake therein, which any jury of twelve men would say
on their oath could not be done by a man of ordinary judgment and
discretion :" Bish. Cr. Law, vol. 2, § 416.
In Young's Ca8e, 8 Term R. 98, AsnijURST, J., thought the inter-
pretation of the statute could not be restrained "to such false pre-
tences only, against which ordinary prudence cannot be supposed
sufficient to' guard." And this it seems is the view taken by the
English courts _t this day. See Russell on Crimes, vol. 2, p. 288;
and Mr. Greaves's note.
.In Jones v. 2he State, 50 Ind. 473, the court states the true
doctrine upon this subject when it says, the laws "are not made
for the protection of the shrewd and vigilant man only, but for the
entire community." But with singular inconsistency the learned
judge who wrote the opinion continues to say: "In the enact-
ment of criminal laws the legislature adopts, as a standard of in-
telligence, neither the highest nor the lowest, but the medium."
What is the medium ? Such a standard is purely ideal. Where is
that man to be found who possesses the exact medium between the
highest and the lowest intelligence ? In the application of such a rule
the result will vary according to the views of the individual who
occupies the position of judge. One may think the means employed
calculated to deceive a person of ordinary caution; another may
think none but a fool would be imposed upon by such means. If
such a standard is adopted is the law a protection for the "entire
community ?" Where is to be found the protection for that unfor-
tunate class who are below the medium in intelligence? If the law
is designed to protect the entire community, then the lowest in in-
telligence as well as the highest, the most imprudent,.incautious and
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credulous are within its pale as well as the shrewd and vigilaut;
and it is safe to say that the former more frequently than the latter
need the protection of the law. If the law is designed to protect
only those who are of medium intelligence and of ordinary prudkneo
and caution, then all who are below this standard are at the mercy
of every trickster, and may be cheated ad libitm.
There is no principle which will support such a construction of
the statute against false pretences. The criminal quality of an act
resides in the intention, and does not depend upon the means adopted
to accomplish it. If the criminal intent is manifest, it will not do
to say the act is not criminal because the means employed to accom-
plish it were not such as arc ordinarily calculated to produce the
result intended.
If I kill a man with felonious intent, shall I say I am not guilty
of murder solely because I employed an agency not ordinarily cal-
culated to produce death ?
It may be more difficult to derive the intent from the act in such
a case, but the intent once established, the act is criminal in the
same degree as if the means employed had been such as are ordinarily
adequate to the end sought. So it may be more difficult in a case
of false pretences to derive the intent to.cheat from pretences not
ordinarily calculated to deceive; but when the intent is established,
the accused cannot exonerate himself by saying that the person
cheated ought not have relied upon the pretences. This exposition
of the law may not commend itself to that class of persons who
think it neither immoral nor unlawful to resort to artifices, tricks
and false pretences in their dealings with their fellow-men; but to
honest, candid men, who believe that perfect integrity in business
transactions is a jewel that should be preserved untarnished, the
construction of the statute contended for in this paper will appear
just, not only according to its letter, but upon the broadest princi-
ples of morality.
Using the language of one of the most eminent judges that ever
sat in any court, "I am yet to learn that a law which punishes a
man for obtaining the property of his unsuspecting neighbor, by
means of any wilful misrepresentation, or deliberate falsehood, with
intent to defraud him of the same, is establishing a rule of morality
which will be deemed too rigid" for respectable and fair business
men.
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